This paper extends McCallum's (1987) nominal targeting rule to a small open economy by allowing for feedback from the exchange rate. Instead of setting parameters in a McCallum-type targeting rule and simulating, the parameters are estimated using a markov switching model. We argue that a model of discrete parameter changes should be adept at capturing sudden changes in policy regime, such as changes in the degree to which monetary policy admits feedback from the exchange rate. We examine the legitimacy of an inflation targeting rule with occasional exchangerate feedback to describe Swiss monetary policy over the past twenty years.
Introduction
The primary purpose ofnominal feedback rules for monetary policy ofthe type suggested by McCallum (1987 McCallum ( , 1988 is to prescribe a time path for an instrument variable which would engender relatively smooth non-inflationary growth in nominal spending. Because it appears unlikely, however, that a central bank would renounce discretion altogether and adhere strictly to a rule, feedback rules have two likely empirical uses. The first is to provide policymakers a reference to guide them in their instrument settings. Policymakers could consult a nominal feedback rule, which is in line with their long-run inflation goal, while retaining the flexibility to lessen short-term volatility in credit markets. The second empirical use is to model past policy under the maintained hypothesis that monetary policy has been implicitly following a feedback rule. By describing past policy with a feedback rule, one can ascertain the implicit goals of past policy and when those goals appeared to change. This article attempts to illustrate both empirical functions, using in-sample results to describe Swiss monetary policy from 1974 to 1987 and out-of-sample results to suggest how modeling monetary policy with a nominal feedback rule might provide useful and timely information to policymakers.
Variants of McCallum's GNP rule have been applied to the U.S. economy as well as various small open economies. 1 The empirical exercises concentrate primarily on counter- 'See McCalIum (1993 , 1994 for Japan and Hall (1990) for Germany, Japan, and Canada. factual simulations and lend support to the claim that a nominal GNP rule could stabilize nominal fluctuations. If one, however, attempts to describe actual monetary policy in a small open economy, the exchange rate ought to be explicitly taken into account. There is ample evidence that exchange rate concerns lead to disruptions in the path of money growth in small open economies. In addition, the degree to which monetary policy accepts feedback from the exchange rate changes continuously. Therefore, a constant parameter model is unlikely to explain monetary policy choices in open economies.
The strategy of this paper is to develop an inflation targeting rule with markov-switching feedback coefficients on both the exchange rate and the price level. A model of discrete parameter changes should be adept at capturing sudden changes in policy regime, i.e., whether or not monetary policy responds strongly to exchange-rate developments. Instead of setting parameters and simulating as in McCallum (1987) , the time-varying parameters are estimated in our framework. Hence, by using a variant of McCallum's rule to estimate a model of actual policy choices, we employ it in a positive exercise to complement the normative simulations undertaken in McCallum's work.
The objectives for analyzing an inflation targeting rule for Switzerland are two-fold.
The first is to examine whether the Swiss practice of monetary targeting is consistent with an inflation targeting rule. Although the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has never announced a formal inflation target, price stability is widely recognized as the overriding goal of Swiss monetary policy. It is of interest to determine whether Swiss monetary policy has maintained its implicit long-run inflation target even during periods of exchange rate targeting and periods of above-normal inflation. The identification of a low implicit inflation target represents a direct test of SNB claims that price stability is the primary objective of Swiss monetary policy. The second objective is to carry the estimated model forward to the 1988-94 period and examine its out-of-sample properties. The latter period followed a major reduction in reserve requirements and the introduction of a new payments system, and thus provides a test of McCallum's criterion that a nominal targeting rule ought to be impervious to financial innovations and regulatory changes. [Lusser (1990) p. 183.] The SNB has regularly announced monetary targets since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System. 2 Rich (1995) reviews the SNB's targetry framework and notes three policy principles. First, price stability is recognized as the main and ultimate goal of monetary policy. Second, the SNB's position is that achievement of price stability is to be based on the control of the money stock. Third, the targetry framework acts as a precommitment device.
The SNB's strategy ofannouncing monetary targets should not be interpreted as a strict policy rule. Rather, the SNB's approach to monetary targeting may best be described as a contingent rule. The targets are designed to impose a medium to long-term constraint on money growth with allowance for short-run flexibility to react to unanticipated shocks.
For instance, the SNB has made clear in its policy statements that it reserves the right to intervene in the foreign exchange market when it feels that an excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc could harm the real economy.
As in other countries, money growth targets are based on explicit inflation goals and forecasts ofpotential output and velocity growth. Starting in 1975, the targets were first set for the annual growth of the monetary aggregate Ml, where Ml was steered by a multiplier model using the monetary base as the instrument. After a brief interlude of exchangerate targeting, annual monetary targets were set for the monetary base beginning in 1980.
2 See Rich (1995) for a detailed account of Swiss monetary policy and Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) for an international comparison.
Finally, in 1990 annual targets were replaced by a five-year target path. The evolution of the target framework reflects changes in style rather than substance, because the basic approach using the monetary base as the instrument to aim for price stability -has remained the same.
Although price stability was emphasized as the main goal of Swiss monetary policy, annual inflation averaged 3.76 percent for the period 1973-1994. In particular there were three notable inflation cycles. At the risk of generalizing, the narrative approach identifies several periods when exchange rate considerations played a major role. The most significant is the [1978] [1979] 3 See Vital and Mengle (1988) for a discussion regarding the SIC system. period, when the monetary target was suspended and replaced by an explicit exchange rate target. Less pronounced episodes include 1975 when the SNB resumed foreign exchange interventions and the years between 1980 and 1983 when the SNB deviated slightly from the monetary target in order to influence the exchange rate.
Description of the Empirical Model
Our indicator model with markov switching takes the monthly growth rate in the seasonally adjusted monetary base less a forecasted growth rate for real base balances and calls this "intended" inflation for the month. Assuming that the monetary base is the instrument and that our forecasts mirror the general consensus at the time, our "intended" 
where MB stands for the seasonally adjusted monetary base, P for the price level, and P The parameter~represents the long-run target rate of inflation, because intended inflation will equal .A~when price-level and exchange-rate gaps equal zero in the long run.
Inferences of the state variable, Si, provide a probability-weighted estimate of the current long-run inflation target: Prob.(Sl~= 0 Y~) x ) t0 (S1 = 0) + Prob.(Slt = 1 J Y~)x )~0(Sl= 1), where 1' represents information available through time t. The sizes of the feedback coefficients, )q(Slj) and .X2(S2j), determine the rate at which price~1evel and exchange-rate gaps are gradually closed through policy actions.
The price level target and the exchange rate target are defined in equations (2) through (5) to be a weighted average of last period's actual and target levels. In the case of the 4 The basic filtering and smoothing algorithms for a markov-switching model are discussed in Hamilton (1989) . 5 Kim (1993) notes that markov switching in the variance is an adept alternative to GARCH models for modeling conditional heteroskedasticity or "ARCH" effects.
price target, we also allow for trend growth,~.
Expected target: ln~=~Prob(Sl~= i I Y~)ln~(S1= i),
Target Exch. Rate:
Expected target: ln~=~Prob(S2t
The variables P and~are, respectively, the target price level and the target exchange rate conditional on particular values of the markov state variables. Rebasing of the target level occurs for values of 5 i,~2 <1. Consequently, one-time shifts in the price level are gradually accommodated into the target path. As S decreases from one, the degree to which the target level is allowed to drift to accommodate recent developments increases. McCallum (1993) has used an analogous weighting scheme; however, in his model~1 remains constant.
Because of the autoregressive nature of equations (2) and (4), inferences of the state at time t would depend on the entire history of past realizations of the state variables if it were not for the collapsing procedure shown in equations (3) and (5). Kim (1994) provides the justification for the collapsing procedure and notes that its use introduces a small approximation to the evaluation of the likelihood function in a markov-switching model. He finds, however, that the approximation does not materially affect the calculated value of the likelihood function or the parameter estimates.
We define six transition probabilities for the three state variables:
P(S1~= 11 Sit_i = 1) = q 1 ,
Implicit in equation (6) 
t=1 i=Oj=Ok=O where the student-f densities are
and F is the gamma function.
Estimation Results and Interpretation
The monthly model is based on estimates for the 1974:1-1987:12 period. For the monetary base (MB) a monthly average series is used, which takes account of the reserve requirements effects. 6 The consumer price index is used as the price variable (P), and the Swiss franc/Deutsche mark exchange rate is used for (e). Both the series for MB and P are seasonally adjusted. The data source is the SNB's databank.
Three versions of the general model described by equations (1) to (6) are estimated and summarized in Table 1 . In Model 1 there is no feedback from the price level. Here the estimated long-run inflation target (~X~) fluctuates within a relatively narrow band, essentially between one and three percent. Without price-level feedback, the inflation rate is targeted period-by-period. In the exchange-rate targeting, the degree of rebasing is 6 Under the pre-1988 system of contemporaneous reserve accounting, the SNB enforced the reserve requirements at the end of each month. This created a sharp rise in reserve demand and was accommodated by the SNB to some extent. These end-of-month effects, also known as the ultimo effect, are averaged out in our series. In the out-of-sample period from 1988-1994, lagged reserve accounting prevailed. The reserve requirements are based on an average of the previous month. This resulted in the disappearance of the ultimo effect. Therefore, a monthly seasonally adjusted figure for the monetary base was used for the post-1988 period. With respect to exchange-rate feedback, Figure 4 plots the model-implied exchange rate target and the actual exchange rate. The graph shows that at times, notably in 1978 and to a lesser extent in early 1982, the vertical distance between the two exchange rates is relatively large. During these episodes the SNB raised base growth in an attempt to arrest the appreciation of the Swiss franc. mid-1993 only after higher than normal inflation had been observed for more than three years.
Appendix: Forecasts of Real Base Growth
The forecasts of real base growth for the in-and out-of-sample periods are based on a model by Kim (1993) . Let (MB/P) stand for the real monetary base, 3M0 the 3-month
Euro franc rate and P the consumer price index. 7 The model generating the forecast is The random walk assumption implies that agents need information before changing their views about the relationships among variables.
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